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Thank you, Jeff [Smith] for the introduction, and also for the invitation to speak here today, at 
the AMIA 2019 Health Informatics Policy Forum. It feels good to be back in DC. I joined the 
University of Texas in September, and I’m still getting used to my transition from federal 
government. This includes speaking in my private capacity as a professor. It was usually at this 
point in my previous public remarks as a securities markets regulator that I gave a disclaimer – 
that my views do not necessarily reflect the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
While that is no longer necessary, I do feel compelled to make a disclaimer: my remarks today 
may at times not be directly applicable to the clinical decision support process.  
My role here today – as I understand it – is to explain from a regulatory perspective the use of 
big data and machine learning practices in financial markets. The purpose is to facilitate a 
conversation of how it might be relevant to the regulation of clinical decision support.  
When AMIA approached me with the idea, I was immediately intrigued. For years I had looked 
at the medical sciences with envy. This is where you get to experiment with randomized control 
trials (RCTs) to understand the causal effects of treatments. This could be a powerful tool for 
understanding the efficacy of securities markets policy.[1] But RCT-like experiments have had 
only minimal uptake in financial market regulation. Public companies and other market 
participants have little incentive to be treated. It is not generally the case that death or despair is 
not on their doorstep. And if it is, they don’t make good test subjects. Regulatory objectives are 
often intended to limit the practices of healthy firms – keep them from inappropriately benefiting 
at the expense of others. So, differential treatment is generally viewed as a recipe for competitive 
harm. Imagine telling Amazon, but not Apple, that they would be required to disclosure sensitive 
information, just to understand whether it was material to investors? It is a regulatory non-
starter.  
The prospect of speaking here opened a line of inquiry that I hadn’t previously considered. Is 
there something that the medical sciences and informatics community could learn from financial 
markets? There might not be RCTs to draw from, but securities markets regulators have 
permitted the rapid adoption of machine learning methods in financial decision-making. 
Admittedly, this is in large part due to absence of rules strictly forbidding it. But the SEC has 
generally taken a permissive, wait-and-see regulatory approach to innovation. This often occurs 
by granting exemptive relief from existing rules. The purpose to evaluate their continued 
relevance. This is the SEC’s version of a regulatory sandbox, which facilitates a different type of 
learning experience. 
Over the years there have been a lot of financial market lessons to learn from. Many innovations 
have not gone well. In fact, some have gone exceedingly bad. I suspect a few have already come 
to your mind. Among them are a class that I think are relevant to the discussion today – those 
that relinquish human control of decisions. Most notably, with algorithmic trading. But also, with 
asset pricing, portfolio allocation, liquidity risk management, and fraud detection. I’m going to 
cover a few examples today – showing both out right failure at one end of the spectrum, and 
underperformance and unrealized risks at the other.  
What is machine learning? 
An evolving concept that poses a challenge to regulators 
Before I dive in, I think it makes sense to start with some level setting remarks about the 
definition of machine learning. I gave my first machine learning talk in 2015. At that time, 
Wikipedia defined the term as “the study of algorithms that could learn from data.” By 2018 
their posted definition was “a field in computer science that gives computers the ability to learn 
without being explicitly programmed.” As of this week, Wikipedia says it is the “study of 
algorithms and statistical models that computer systems use to perform a specific task without 
using explicit instructions, relying on patterns and inference instead.”  
So, when we talk about regulating the use machine learning, we need to first recognize that it is a 
bit of an elusive concept. The semantics have changed over time, and I suspect they will continue 
to do so. This can be a challenge to a regulator seeking to draw bright lines around practices that 
use it.  
Wikipedia’s inclusion of statistical models in its most recent definition acknowledges what the 
social sciences have long recognized – the field of computer science is reinventing what, in many 
ways, already existed. Machine learning emerged from a body of techniques and methods first 
introduced by statisticians. Many sat dormant on the shelves of concept and theory until the 
necessary data and computing resources arrived to make them a reality. Computer scientists were 
first to recognize the new opportunities.  
But as these definitions also imply, machine learning is more than just algorithms and models. It 
is as much about how they are applied. This is where computer scientists have excelled; they 
have proved better than social scientists at adapting the methods to real world problems.  
One reason for the success of computer scientists is that they have unshackled themselves from 
the social science requirement of understanding why the models work. They are relatively 
unconcerned about the statistical significance of the model factors. They care more about the 
overall predictive power of a model.  
To that end, they pursue associations, interactions, and non-linearities unencumbered by a strict 
need for human understanding. And the methods they use to get there are rather meta; they use 
algorithms to find the most relevant algorithms. If the objective is predictive power only, then it 
is easier for a machine to evaluate hundreds and thousands of model specifications to find the 
right one. Removing the human in model selection is a tangible example of machine learning. 
In financial markets, where algorithms have long had a place, these developments pose new 
risks. Removing human understanding and judgement in the application of models can be 
catastrophic when they go wrong. The predictive consequences from a bad retirement decision is 
far more severe than a bad consumer purchase recommendation or Alexa music play suggestion. 
There are no do-overs.  
Moreover, algorithms in financial markets have already demonstrated great capacity for costly 
consequences. There is no doubt that they have on average improved our lives by increasing the 
efficiency of capital market operations. But their goofs have been on an order of magnitude that 
few humans could have achieved. 
1987 Market Crash 
Algorithmic risk first appears in financial markets 
Regulators first thought about the need to evaluate the risks of algorithmic trading more than 
three decades ago. On Monday, October 19th – also known as Black Monday – the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average dropped 23%. It remains today the largest single day drop in the history of the 
index and caused widespread panic and disruption in the financial system.  
 
A presidential task force was 
commissioned to understand what 
happened. In 1988 they issued a 
report.[2] In it they cited a number of 
economic factors that contributed to 
the downward pressure on prices, but 
none were identified as the cause of 
the crash. Instead, the task force 
pointed to program trading, which 
acted as an accelerant of the price 
declines.  
At that time, large institutions offered 
a product called ‘portfolio insurance’ 
to their clients.[3] The objective was 
to limit their losses in a declining 
market. They used computer 
algorithms to calculate how much 
insurance to buy, which was done by 
selling futures contracts. As futures 
prices fell, other large market 
participants used the NYSE's (Designated Order Turnaround or “DOT”) automated execution 
system to engage in arbitrage between futures and equities markets. In this way, additional 
portfolio insurance purchases in futures markets drove equity prices down.  
The basic effect of the computer algorithms was to sell stock as the prices fell, which 
mechanically induced the selling of more stock. This is believed to have exacerbated the price 
effects of fundamental information in the market. And it is some of the first evidence of rules-
based, algorithmic trading that removes human judgement, induces investor herding, and makes 
markets fragile.[4] 
The problem, one that endures today, is that market participants often use models to make 
investment decisions that are locally optimal, for an individual investor or institution. They do 
not always account for broader environmental factors, including the impact of their collective 
actions. In economics, this can be explained as the difference between a partial and general 
equilibrium model. Partial equilibrium models are easier to design and implement, but they don’t 
account for the potentially important feedbacks considered in a general equilibrium model.[5] 
2010 Flash Crash 
Algo trading temporarily moves market by $1 trillion  
It is likely that the algorithms used at the time of the 1987 crash were simple regression models, 
a basic method in the modern machine learning toolbox. The response at that time was not to 
regulate their use. Instead, the task force recommended that “circuit breaker mechanisms (such 
as price limits and coordinated trading halts) should be formulated and implemented to protect 
the market system.” Algorithmic trading would continue, but if models went awry, trading would 
pause before there was a crash. This would allow humans to take stock of the situation and 
rationally respond.  
In the 1990’s, new computerized trading systems called electronic communication networks 
(ECNs) emerged. Remember, Instanet, Island, and Archipelago? They allowed traders to bypass 
exchanges and match orders with each other at lower cost. This jumpstarted the online trading 
industry we know today. Regulators approved of the new competition and in 2006 adopted 
Regulation NMS (National Market System) to codify open access based on best price execution. 
This was the death knell for the NYSE floor traders. By 2008 they were being phased out in 
favor of fully electronic trading. 
 
On May 6, 2010, the 
market experienced its 
first flash crash. 
According to a SEC-
CFTC report, an 
automated execution 
algorithm initiated $4 
billion sell order in 
futures market without 
regard to price or 
time.[6]  Like with the 
1987 Crash, cross 
market hedging created 
severe downward price 
pressure on equity 
markets. The market dropped nearly 10% in the span of a few minutes.  
By this time, high frequency traders (HFTs) accounted for 80% of the dollar volume of US 
equity trades.[7] The models underlying the trading were proprietary and ill-understood by 
regulators. The speed with which the crash occurred and then recovered was stunning. It was 
over before humans could process what was happening. And the market-wide breakers adopted 
after Black Monday were never tripped. 
Once again, an algorithm had caused serious disruption. One trillion dollars in market 
capitalization temporarily vanished because of a $4 billion automated trade. It led to further 
tightening of the price bands and conditions for trading halts, but no regulation was introduced to 
limit the use of algorithms.[8] The regulatory approach continued to favor reaction over 
prevention. Algorithmic innovation in trading continued under a stricter monitoring regime.   
2012 Knight Capital Trading Glitch 
A $460 million coding error 
This regulatory approach came into question on August 1st, 2012. That morning, Knight Capital, 
an equity market maker, erroneously sent more than 4 million orders into the market when 
attempting to fill just 212 customer orders. In just 45 minutes, Knight had assumed a net long 
position in 80 stocks of approximately $3.5 billion and net short position in 74 stocks of 
approximately $3.15 billion.[9] Unwinding the unwanted positions resulted in a loss to the 
Knight Capital of $460 million. 
 
Many of the stocks Knight erroneously 
traded reached volumes far greater 
than their typically daily average. And 
like the 2010 flash crash, prices 
temporarily moved away from their 
fundamental values. Radio Shack 
shares increased 27% in the first few 
minutes of trading before falling back 
to the previous day’s close. Rare 
Element Resources, which Knight 
shorted, fell 29% on more than 3 
billion shares traded. The day before, 
volume was less than a million shares. 
Then Chairman of the SEC, Mary 
Schapiro, called it an unacceptable 
event.[10] Knight was fined $12 
million for not having controls 
designed to limit the risks associated 
with their direct access to the markets. 
The firm survived the incident with a cash infusion from private investors and was subsequently 
acquired by another securities firm. 
Unfortunately for Knight, rules tightening the price bands and conditions for trading halts 
following the 2010 flash crash were not yet effective. Exchanges were still in the process of 
implementing a limit up-limit down mechanism that would have paused trading if prices moved 
too fast. This could have prevented some of the disruption and ultimate trading losses.  
The impact of this event led to the 2014 adoption of Regulation SCI.[11] The acronym stands for 
Systems Compliance and Integrity. Its aim was to restore investor confidence in markets by 
regulating the technology controls at the largest market participants – those most essential to the 
efficient functioning of the U.S. securities markets. The measures, like with past SEC actions, 
did not limit the use of algorithms. It focused on the policies and procedures at entities using 
them. It also gave regulators expanded tools to discipline disruptive behavior.  
This episode was another demonstration that computer algorithms can create havoc in ways it is 
hard to imagine a human could attain. In the old days, losing half a billion dollars took months 
and years of poor decision making or skullduggery. Now it takes less than an hour.  
2014 Treasury Market Flash Rally 
A market disruption with still unknown cause 
In 2014, when the term machine learning began entering the vocabulary of financial market 
participants, a new type of flash crash emerged. On October 15 of that year, treasury yields 
experienced unusually high and unexplained volatility. The 37-basis-point trading range over the 
day was historic in size. 
 
During one ten-minute span, 
the ten-year yield dropped 
and rapidly rebounded 16 
basis points. It was dubbed a 
flash rally because treasury 
prices are inversely related 
to yields.  
Only the US debt 
downgrade in 2011 and two 
financial crisis events – the 
coordinated rate cut in 2008 
and announcement of large 
scale asset purchases in 
2009 – proved more 
volatile. Yet, the only 
notable news on October 15 
was the release of somewhat 
weaker-than-expected U.S. retail sales.  
 
To this day, the brightest 
minds in the regulatory 
world can’t explain why it 
happened. After a 
yearlong investigation, an 
official report by staffs of 
the U.S. Treasury, Board 
of Governors, New York 
Fed, CFTC, and SEC 
offered only vague 
ideas. [12] An early finger 
was pointed at principal 
trading firms (PTFs), the 
algorithmic frequency 
traders in treasury 
markets. But the 
government report did not 
uncover any smoking gun 
evidence. They could not 
isolate any aberrant trading from a coding error like with Knight Capital. And they did not find a 
patient zero trade like what triggered the 2010 flash crash. 
That the joint regulatory effort could not explain what happened is scary. The large team had 
access to the fully history of trading records, the market participants doing the trading, and world 
class analytical tools.  
But they did provide an interesting observation. The most volatile period of the day was 
dominated by multiple PTFs trading with each other using different strategies. During this 
period, bank-dealers widened their spreads, meaning the human conduits for real supply and 
demand in the market stepped away from trading. This left the PTF algorithms to trade with each 
other. Some were aggressive – trading in the direction of price movement. Some were passive – 
leaning against the trading wind.  
The report did not offer an interpretation for how this contributed to the volatility. But it doesn’t 
take much imagination to hypothesize a bot war. Algorithms are trained to act on signals. In this 
case, estimating the inventory needs of bank-dealers and their customers. When the bank-dealers 
stepped away, the algorithms lost their primary signals. What then, informed their trading? The 
trading decisions of other uninformed algorithms? 
User abuse of algorithms   
The infinite money cheat code 
The most recent example of a software glitch in equity trading is on a far smaller scale than the 
previous examples. And it doesn’t involve algorithmic trading. But it demonstrates an important 
risk for all software developers. If there is a way for a user to abuse or misuse an application, 
they will find it.  
A month ago today, a vulnerability at the no-fee online trading firm Robinhood was reported by 
several news outlets.[13] Users of the platform were purportedly allowed to borrow money 
against their holdings in excess of the legally permissible 50%. A glitch in the code treated 
certain securities purchased as additional collateral to borrow against. This flaw was shared in a 
Reddit user group. It allowed retail investors to lever up the same way Bear Sterns did leading 
into the financial crisis. And the self-reported results weren’t much different. 
One Reddit user claimed to borrow $1.3 million on a $15,000 deposit. He reported losing 
$180,000 trading AMD put options – another form of (notional) leverage.[14] The days 
following the code bug saw more users reporting the use of even greater leverage with similarly 
bad outcomes. The experiences are reminiscent of the hubris that infected the dot.com era. A 
good illustration that some behaviors don’t change; they just move across generations. 
 
These ‘clever’ investors learned that leverage makes the good times better and the bad times 
worse. A Robinhood spokesperson confirmed with Bloomberg that they identified a small 
number of accounts engaging in problematic trading and made a permanent update to their 
systems to prevent further abuse. One Reddit user put it more succinctly: “banned from ever 
using Robinhood again.” 
It is too soon to know what the regulatory response will be. The focus has thus far been on the 
colorful user experiences. And some will cite caveat emptor – these investors learned a valuable 
lesson. But a violation of Regulation T, which limits the use of leverage in margin trading, is a 
significant allegation for Robinhood.[15] The regulation protects retail investors who may not 
fully appreciate the larger scale risk of leverage. It also protects the financial system from the 
potentially destructive effect of its collective use by the market.  
The example also highlights the risk of FinTech more broadly. From the west coast, you 
sometimes hear it branded TechFin, reflecting a desire to put ‘technology’ in front of the old 
school practices of ‘finance’. But as I alluded to before, disruption in financial services can have 
more lasting consequences than common product market decisions. Getting someone’s movie 
recommendation wrong does less harm than a bad investment outcome. Regulators may decide 
to make this a reinforcing example of why the existing rules are there. 
Regulation of machine learning 
Should the focus be on the algorithms or the entities using them? 
At this point you may be wondering about the role of machine learning in these examples. I think 
it is safe to assume that if any of the algorithms prior to 2015 were using machine learning 
methods, the users didn’t know it. Computer science was just beginning to claim finance as part 
of their domain. I think it is equally safe to assume that machine learning methods are imbedded 
in most of the algorithms in use today. But the strict answer is that we don’t know. Because 
regulators do not currently restrict or approve the use of algorithms in financial trading, products, 
and services, there is only anecdotal evidence to rely on.  
That machine learning is nonetheless embedded in current financial market practices is 
reinforced by regulators acknowledging that they use it too. That’s right, regulators commonly 
use machine learning methods in their supervisory activities. And they have been for a 
while.[16] Natural language processing techniques helps them analyze narrative disclosure in 
regulatory filings. Unsupervised learning methods identify latent topics – that is, patterns in 
regulatory disclosures that humans are unlikely to detect. These use random forest models to 
connect these topics to historical inspections and enforcement actions to predict the likelihood of 
future transgressions. And if you are thinking about insider trading, this is where the most 
sophisticated methods reside.[17] If you do it, regulators will likely know about it. 
For a regulator, experience using machine learning methods provides valuable context on how to 
regulate them. Most notably, it brings acute awareness to the performance sensitivity an 
algorithm has to its applied environment. Recent experiences in financial markets shows how 
hard it is to predict how they will operate and interact in a complex system, particularly when 
inputs to the models are constantly changing and outside the control of the modeler. Case in 
point: five federal regulators took a year to conclude that they didn’t understand what caused the 
treasury market flash rally.  
Short of a draconian ban on their use, machine learning methods in financial markets will 
continue to generate the occasional bad outcome. Regulators do not have qualified staff in 
requisite numbers to systematically review and approve models. Even if they did, it is impossible 
to conceive every scenario that the real world has to offer. Backtesting a model is only as good 
as the training data you give it. In financial markets, the future rarely looks like the past, and 
there is no substitute for going live. 
The SEC’s general approach of entity-based regulation is a more practical course than it is 
ideological. Putting the responsibility of technology controls on the innovator is more efficient 
than introducing an algorithmic approval process. Putting market protections in place to limit 
potential damage from errant algorithms is easier than preventing it. With algorithmic trading, 
this means pecuniary penalties for disruptive behavior, and when it occurs, slowing time with 
pauses and halts to let human decision-making rejoin the price discovery process.  
Outsourcing the supervision critical market functions in this way has engendered costly learning 
experiences in financial markets, just as it has in other areas of regulation (e.g., Boeing 737 
Max).  
That the Food and Drug Administration opened a public comment for a proposed regulatory 
framework on the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence in software as a medical 
device provides a new set of challenges and tradeoffs to the risks and rewards of technology. 
[18] And the use of machine learning technology in clinical support faces many of the same 
challenges it faces in financial market applications. Most notably, there is an inherent human 
distrust in a blackbox decisions and recommendations. Humans want interpretability. Social 
scientists have understood this for generations. Knowing the reason for a outcome can be more 
important than the predicting it. 
I hope that the reactor panel to remarks can make sense of my regulatory experience in the 
context of clinical support. And I look forward to hearing where there are commonalities and 
differences between finance and medicine. 
To close, I would like to offer one last thought on the use of randomized control trials. It is ironic 
that financial regulators are reticent to apply similar methods in determining policy, particularly 
when considering the magnitude of disruption and harm that technological innovation has 
repeatedly engendered in markets. I would find it instructive, and a lesson to financial market 
regulators, if the medical sciences ultimately used RTCs to assess the efficacy of AI/ML 
technology. 
It has been my pleasure to speak here today. 
 
Some of the concluding remarks may not accurately reflect the delivered address as they were 
not formalized in writing at that time. 
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